



Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Test Approach Supporting the Development of Regulatory Recommendations for Integration with the National Airspace System

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
Flight Test 6 Overview

- UAS Integration in the NAS Project
- Flight Test 3
- Flight Test 4
- Flight Test Series 6 Overview and Objectives
- RADAR Characterization and Scripted Encounters Overview
- Full Mission Overview
- RADAR Characterization Results
- Scripted Encounters Results
- Full Mission Data Analysis



FT6 Full Mission Research Team

- Conrad Rorie
- Garrett Sadler
- Casey Smith
- Jillian Keeler
- Gilbert Wu
- Wei-Ching Wang



UAS Integration in the NAS Project

- NASA UAS Integration in the NAS Project
 - Part of NASA Integrated Aviation Systems Program
 - Supports RTCA SC-228 in defining DAA standards
 - Investigates and validates multiple facets of DAA for UAS
- Detect and Avoid (DAA)
 - Replaces “See and Avoid” for UAS
 - ADS-B, RADAR, Active Surveillance instead of human eyes
 - Quantifiable definition of “Well-Clear”
- Phase 1 “En-Route” Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
 - Large UAS
 - Transiting through Class E airspace
- Phase 2 Topics
 - DAA in the terminal area
 - **Low Size Weight and Power (Low SWaP) operations below 10,000ft**

- Objectives

- Validate simulation results from DAA modeling
- Investigate DAA/Collision Avoidance interoperability
- Expand test architecture

- Approach


- Scripted encounters between Ikhana and manned aircraft
- Air-to-air RADAR (ATAR), ADS-B, Mode-C surveillance sensors
- Sensor fusion tracker
- DAA algorithms generate alerting and guidance
 - Stratway+
 - JADEM
 - CPDS



- Results

- Unsteady alerting and guidance observed with non-cooperative sensors
 - Emphasized need for handling of uncertainty for non-cooperative sensors
 - Led to hysteresis, uncertainty, track generation requirements for RTCA DO-365
- Alerting ranges for high-speed (400 kts) and maneuvering intruders
- Refined systems under test
 - JADEM and CPDS improvements
 - Stratway+ developed into DAIDALUS
 - Honeywell sensor fusion tracker
 - State filtering for GA-ASI ATAR





Flight Test 4

- Objectives

- Validate stressing cases for DAA MOPS – low speed, small RCS, high vertical closure rate, multiple intruders
- Validate DAA/CA interoperability
- Validate well-clear recovery guidance
- Validate reference test vectors for DO-365
- Validate alert timing

- Approach

- Scripted encounters between Ikhana and KingAir, Gulfstream, T-34C, TG-14
- JADEM, CPDS DAIDALUS as DAA systems
- Test cards developed for NASA Ames & Langley, GA-ASI, Honeywell, RTCA






Flight Test 4


- Results

- Candidate MOPS alert times sufficient for UAS to remain well-clear
- Well-clear recovery guidance of limited utility with ATAR
- Discovered cases where TCAS RA occurs before loss of DAA well-clear
- Test vectors incorporated into DO-365, DO-366
- DAIDALUS became reference DAA implementation for DO-365





- Investigate Low Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) UAS DAA operations below 10,000 ft
 - 3 Phases
 - **RADAR Characterization** – Measure the performance of a Low SWaP non-cooperative sensor
 - Sensor accuracy, range, azimuth, elevation
 - **Scripted Encounters** – Validate the performance of the non-cooperative DWC
 - Alerting and guidance stability, maneuver effectiveness
 - **Full Mission** – Measure the human response data in a simulated National Airspace System (scenario)
 - Pilot response time, separation between aircraft, subjective acceptability
 - Conducted between July and November 2019





Detect and Avoid for UAS

- DAA Well-Clear (DWC) is lost when the separation between a UAS and another aircraft is within the vertical, horizontal, and time thresholds defined in the DAA MOPS
 - Candidate Non-Cooperative DWC:
 - Vertical (h^*) = 450 ft.
 - Horizontal (HMD^*) = 2200 ft.
 - Time (τ_{mod}^*) = 0 seconds
- An alert time to DWC is also calculated to allow the human pilot to maneuver
 -  Corrective Alert: Pilot has time to contact ATC to negotiate DAA maneuver
 -  Warning Alert: Pilot must maneuver immediately to avoid losing well-clear
- A DAA display provides the pilot with maneuver guidance in the form of heading and altitude “bands”
 - Pilot maneuvers so that the UAS heading or altitude is outside the bands






NASC TigerShark XP

- Manufacturer: Navmar Applied Sciences Corp
 - UAS Type: DoD Group 3
 - Wingspan: 22 ft.
 - Endurance: 8-12 hour
 - Max speed: 80 KTAS
-
- Radome nose fabricated to house Low Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) non-cooperative RADAR sensor – Honeywell “DAPA-Lite”
 - Addition of exhaust injection smoke system for visual ID from manned aircraft
 - Mobile Operations Center (MOC) houses internal pilot using Piccolo Control Center
 - MOC linked to Research Ground Control Station (RGCS) where DAA system was housed





Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) and LVC-DE

- VSCS
 - Displays DAA alerting and guidance
 - Pilot GUI for control of vehicle
 - Developed by AFRL
- Live, Virtual and Constructive Distributed Environment (LVC-DE)
 - Connects geographically distant assets
 - Connects live assets with virtual and constructive elements
 - Combines environmental flight with simulated environment
 - FT6 simulated a sector within Oakland airspace




- **Constructive Traffic:** Simulated traffic on scripted route, no human intervention
- **Virtual Traffic:** Simulated traffic controlled by pseudo pilots
- **Live Traffic:** UAS and manned “intruder” aircraft



Full Mission Concept of Operations

Live Elements – NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC)

Virtual Elements - NASA Ames Research Center (ARC)




- **Subject Pilot:** Non-NASA UAS pilot who is naïve to conditions of test encounters
- **Virtual ATC:** Trained controller managing the UAS and all cooperative traffic in the simulated sector



FT6 Full Mission

- Each subject pilot encountered 6 live targets
 - 4 with Low SWaP non-cooperative sensor
 - 2 with cooperative sensor (ADS-B)
 - Intruder speeds: 170kts or 100kts
 - Encounter geometry: Head-on, 90° crossing, 45° crossing
 - Encounter locations can shift
- 7 Subject pilots
 - Active military
 - UAV type certification
 - Fixed wing
 - Previous year experience
 - Current FAA medical or equivalent
 - Corrected to normal vision
 - Full color perception
 - Private Pilot Certificate
 - No previous UAS Integration in the NAS HITL activities





Full Mission Subject Training and Metrics

- Training
 - Day before flight
 - Intro to FT6, responsibilities, vehicle overview
 - VSCS Interface: information display, sending commands, vehicle behavior
 - DAA System: alert meaning, guidance, surveillance system
 - Mission: airspace, ATC, secondary tasks
 - Simulation practice
 - Morning of flight
 - Refresher practice of simulated encounters
- Data Collected
 - Separation between UAS and live traffic
 - Pilot response: ATC coordination and alert reaction times
 - Pilot subjective workload and system acceptability
 - Questionnaires:
 - After encounter
 - After circuit
 - After simulation
 - Debriefing interview






FULL MISSION RESULTS



Aircraft Response Time

- Slower responses to Correctives compared to HITL results
 - Higher proportion of Corrective alerts in FT6, longer average alert duration
 - More pilots on common voice frequency
- RT distribution (non-cooperative traffic)
 - Corrective at First Alert: 80% of RTs within 15sec (Max = 20sec)
 - Warning at First Alert: 80% of RTs within 10sec (Max = 11sec)




Aircraft response time – time elapsed from alert to first maneuver upload



ATC Coordination

- ATC coordination rates nearly doubled in FT6 compared to HITL
 - More time to receive ATC approval before Warning onset (~12 sec)
 - Variability in closure rates due to changing atmospheric conditions
 - Warning onset typically occurred during transmission
 - On average, pre-approved maneuver uploads came 14 seconds after first alert

Proportion of Maneuvers with ATC Approval
(Corrective at First Alert)







Separation Performance


- Zero Losses of DWC with either equipage
 - ‘Fast’ intruders accounted for the lowest closest points of approach
 - Closest call: 2577ft. Horz. CPA (Fast Head On, 27sec-to-LoDWC @ 1st alert)
 - Unintentional button click delayed pilot’s response
 - Encounters with the cooperative sensor predictably had higher closest points of approach
 - Due to unrestricted detection range

Horizontal Separation at CPA (non-coops)



Closest Point of Approach by Sensor Type






Post-Encounter

- Pilots felt that they were able to achieve sufficient separation in all four non-cooperative encounters, and found the DAA guidance bands useful


I was able to achieve sufficient separation from the intruder aircraft(s) using the alerting and guidance in this encounter:

1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree



The DAA guidance bands were useful for solving this encounter:


1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree





Post-Test

- Majority thought alerting provided enough time to **initiate maneuver** in most cases
 - Slower aircraft intruding were okay, faster ones were “pushing it”
- Mixed responses on **timing to contact ATC** at corrective alert level
 - Pilots reported instances where encounter immediately elevated to Warning while attempting coordination
 - “Sometimes frequency congestion didn’t allow time to coordinate”





Field of Regard (FOR) Considerations


- Intruder A/C fell out of FOR during 26 of 27 avoidance events
 - Smaller detection range -> larger turns required for resolution
 - Stresses 110° azimuth limit, especially at fast closure rates
 - Wider turns observed in live flight compared to HITL
 - Pilots added buffer to target headings to account for crosswinds
 - DAA information remained absent for at least 13 seconds (max = 87sec)
 - Half never re-appeared on display
 - Occasionally, symbology disappeared before Clear-of-Conflict
 - 59% of intruders reached CPA while outside of FOR
 - Lost more separation without conflicting traffic in sight
 - Always diverged in time to avoid LoDWC or early return to course
 - Pilots spent more time off course than previous HITLs (63sec)

Study	Azimuth Drops before CoC	Avg. Turn Size (Fast Intruders)
FT6	11/27 (41%)	128deg
HITL	9/36 (25%)	90 deg



Summary

- **Scripted Encounters**
 - For maneuvers executed in a timely fashion more than half of these maneuvers effectively resolved conflicts
 - A 3.5 nmi surveillance range achieved a higher success rate (~70%) than 2.5 and 2.0 nmi (50%)
 - For ineffective encounters, the lead contributing factors are
 - Pilots' decision
 - Change of Intruder's velocity
 - It may be beneficial for pilots to add more maneuver "buffer" beyond the heading bands to the target heading
 - Maneuvers are more effective when buffers are larger
- **Full Mission**
 - **Pilot Performance** (compared to HITL)
 - Zero Losses of DAA Well Clear
 - HITL: 1 LoDWC due to Early Return to Course
 - Slower response times, but more ATC-approved maneuvers
 - More caution alerting due to slower ownship speeds
 - **Pilots were still often unable to respond to Corrective alerts**
 - All but two encounters reached warning-level status
 - **Pilot Feedback**
 - Low workload ratings overall
 - Moderate increases for fast-closure encounters
 - Sufficiency of DAA guidance bands rated favorably
 - Corrective alert timing inadequate for ATC coordination



FT6 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- High winds impacted flight operations with the Tigershark
 - Low ground speeds – difficult to set up encounters
 - Challenging launch and recovery
 - Survey multiple launch and recovery sites as best practice – cross winds
- Multiple flight plans provided flexibility
 - Allowed test to continue when part of airspace was unavailable
 - Allowed multiple encounter attempts during full mission
- Rehearsal for full mission a necessity
 - Full mission procedures needed practice from the entire team to lock down
- Visual conspicuity an issue for vehicle of this size
 - Smoke system for visual identification was of limited utility
 - Visibility of smoke depended on weather – overcast skies and haze hampered visual ID



Special Thanks To....

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- Sam Kim
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- Rocky Garcia
- Hernon Posada
- Victor Loera
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- LaRC

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- NASC

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- Bryan Hazlett
- Tia Williams
- Emily Fox

- Honeywell

- Jamal Haque
- Marc Pos
- John Ihlen
- Eric Euteneuer



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


Questions?



XP-002 Unpack / Assembly

XP-002 Getting the "Rock Star" Treatment



TMO operations during Lakebed Tow Test



TMO established at B4864



XP-002 and NASC Team



Lakebed Tow Test Configuration



BACKUP